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IN THE 
UPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
B. ERWIN, HARRY FIKCH and 
R. 0. PEARCE, 
Defendants and .Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 620C 
"""'"'""~ REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
;BALL & MUSSER 
-EDWARD F. RICHAR.DS, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
i1iiiiiii1iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiti.. E. B. Erwin, on the Brief 
H. L. ~IULLINER, 
Attorney for Appellants 
R. 0. Pearce and Harry Finch. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST ... -\.TE OF lTTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai·ntiff a·nd Respo'rtdent, 
vs. 
E. B. ERWIN, HARR\~ FINCH and 
R. 0. PEARCE, 
Defendants and ~-!ppellants .. 
CASE 
NO. 6200 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
This case has been analyzed in the previous briefs 
filed. This brief will be devoted to calling attention to 
some specific and basic points of difference which ap-
pear to us to be of conclusive importance on this ap-
peal. The same order of discussion. will be ofbserved 
as was followed in the main briefs after a brief discus-
sion of the indictment and evidence. 
THE INIDICTMENT 
This indictment, it will be recalled, accused these 
appellants and others, naming Ben Harmon, deceased, 
and Mr. Thacker, acquitted, that they ''did wilfully and 
unlawfully agree to cDmbine, conspire and confederate'' 
~ • 4 ''On the 6th day of January, 1936, and on divers 
other days and times between that day and the first 
day of January, 1938, • * * to permit, allow, assist and 
enable houses of ill fame * • * lotteries, dice games, 
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slot machines, book malting, and other gambling devices 
and other games of chance to !be kept, maintained and 
opera ted. '' 
While we do not waive any of the .contentions as 
to the indictment made in our former briefs, we empha-
size again that this is an attempt to allege an agree-
ment. What were the terms of the agreement~ 
There is no point to arguing the validity of the 
statute as to short forms of pleadings in ·criminal cases. 
The cases cited in the Brief of Mr. Erwin are conclusive 
that this cannot limit the constitutional provision of a 
defendant to be informed, ''of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him.'' 
(References hereafter to the Erwin Brief will be 
marked "E", .and to the Finch and Pearce Brief will 
be marked ''F and P''). 
The point is that this indictment does not suffici-
ently allege the agreement to enable a defendant to he 
informd as to the nature of the a.ccusation or so as to 
protect him against other prosecution for the same 
a:cts that might be involved under the generality of this 
allegation. 
P1articularly, it does not allage the "means agreed 
upon", to "permit, allow, as.sist and. enable". Clearly 
it eould he in the mind of the Grand Jury that the ap-
pellants agreed to solicit !business for these places, that 
they agreed to advertise these places, or that they 
agreed to provide financial assistance, or housing as-
sistance for these places, or that they agreed to partici-
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pate in the profit~ front them, or thnt they agreed to 
afford polict~ proeetion for tht\~l~ pln<.'Ps, or thP oper-
ators thereof. The:::-e or any nuntber of other tnean8 of 
assistance might have been in the nrind of the Grand 
Jury, or might be later charged against tht.\st~ defPnd-
ants, as constituting the ··means agreed upon.'' 
The case cited (E. bf. p. 15) where it \vas held 
that an indictment "to injure, oppre:::-s, threaten, or in-
timidate'' citizens. w·as in~ufficient, is certainly in point 
in principle on this matter. 
While it is now conceded that the indictment could 
not "be cured_ by the Bill of Particulars (Respondent:'s 
brief, p. 45) this \vas not the position taken in the trial 
court but an effort was made to allege the means agreed 
upon or supply the same by the Bill of Particulars. The 
Bill of Particulars, however, in no way supplied this de-
ficiency in the indictment. It did inject into the case 
another cause of action entirely, which has lbeen relied 
npon as the charge here in the opening ·s tatem·en t, in 
the evidence, in the instructions, and now finally in the 
brief of respondents. 
This allegation in the Bill of Particulars said ''That 
during all of the period between the 15th day of March, 
1936, and the First day of January, 1938, the said ap-
pellants permitted, allowed, assisted and enabled houses 
of ill fame'', etc. ''"' "' * to he kept, maintained and op-
erated 1j: * * by then and there failing and refusing to 
make arrests. '' 
'Thus the Bill of Particulars alleged a substantive 
offense eommitted by the appellants and for which they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
were tried. The indictment, however, alleges no sub-
stantive offense but alleges an agrement which was the 
corpus delicti of the offense. 
(See E. lhf. p. 23 et seq.) on the proposition that 
the District Attorney can not "assume to ·specify" the 
offense the Grand Jury intends to charge. 
·Coming back to the indictment the question is what 
are the acts or what are the things that thes·e people 
~agreed to do or perform. It is argued that the object 
of the conspiracy was to penni t or allow as alleged. 
Clearly this might be accompliS'hed by doing any num-
ber of things or by doing nothing. 
Even in a ·civil ease if a person should attempt to 
allege an agreement he couldn't allege it without stat-
ing what it was that the parties agreed to do or per-
form. Even 'vhere .a. substantive offense is alleged and 
it is alleged that defendants agreed to confedenate to 
commit it, it is required that they allege the acts that 
they a.greed to do or perform. 
The Topham ease, decided by our ·Supreme Court, 
cited at page 19 of the Erwin Brief, is a leading case 
on the general principle, sustained hy the following 
ca.ses, some of which ,are ibased upon the Topham case. 
As the indictments used somewhat similar language to 
that used here, they will illustrate this defect. 
In Abrams v. State 161, P 3.31, (Okla.) the defend-
ant was ·charged that he unlawfully "procured" a girl 
to become an inmate of a house of ill f,ame. Holding the 
Complaint bad the Court said, and cited the Topham 
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caH~ in ~upport of it~ t)puuon, that thL\ n~L\ nf thP \Vord 
··procured'' "~a~ not ~ufficieut. that t'hert' are numy 
things that might haYt~ been done to ec.nnt\ under the 
definition of this word and ~aid: 
''It is then ne·ees~ary. in charging an offense 
claimed to be embraced "ithin the general lan-
guage of the statute. to set forth the particular 
things or acts charged to haYe been done with 
reasonable certainty and distinctness.'' 
People z-. Burns, :2±1 P. 935 (Cal.), is another case 
~ 
which cites the Topham case. and where the defendant 
was charged and convicted for inducing a· female, etc., 
to enter prostitution. in that the defendant qid unlaw-
fully '·cause, induce, persuade and encourage" her. This 
was the language of the statute. The Court held the in-
dictment bad. It recites that each of these words had 
a meaning and that effect, should lby the Court, be 
given to the meaning of each and that the defendant 
therefore could not knDw in advance what acts might be 
proved. That it was necessary to allege what ''was the 
means'' used by the defendant. 
Cole v. State, 177 P. 129, was a case in which the 
defendant was charged that he did knowingly ''harbor, 
aid, assist", etc., a fugitiYe from justice. The court 
said: 
"How would the defendant be able to pre-
pare his defense without :being informed by the 
information how ·he enabled or how he assisted 
or how he harbored, or how he concealed, said 
~ugi tive from justice. ' ' 
This court cite-s 124· U. S. 483, 31 L. Ed. 516 upon 
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the proposition that while an indictment may charge an 
offense in the language of the statute that the descrip-
ion nevertheless "must be accompanied by a statement 
of all the particulars es-sential * * * to acquaint the ac-
cused with what he must meet on trial." 
People v. Z·ambounis, 167 N. E. 183, (N. Y.). 
The defendant was eharged that he did unlawfully, 
with intent to sell, show lewd, obscene, etc., printed mat-
ter. The court said while it was not necessary to al-
lege, this, material in full, the defendant should be in-
formed of the "nature of the eharge against him and of 
the act .constituting it", not only to enaible him to pre-
pare for trial, but to protect him from again being tried 
for the same offense, and that no ·defendant should be 
required to resort to the testimony in a:ny case to show 
that he had already been tried for the same acts. 
In Hood v. United States, 43 F (2) 353 (10 C. C.) it 
wa:s charged that the defendant did ''receive, conceal, 
buy and facilitate the transportation, ·concealment and 
s:ale" of narcotic drugs. The court held that the charge 
did not identify the offense within the rule of Skelley v. 
United States, 37 F. ( 2) 503, and that the charge should 
have been sufficiently definite to identify the acts com-
mitted and distinguish them from ·other similar offenses. 
In People v. Ward, 42 P. 894 (Cal.) it was held that 
although alleged in the language of the statute, that the 
defendant did ''give a bribe'', the indictment was not 
good because it did not eharge the defendant with "any 
acts'' of giving· anything of value. 
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There are numerou8 eft8e8 holding that \Vh~re stat-
utes are general in attempting to ~tate offensl)S and do 
not specify the "'·a.l'"t$" "yhich are made criminal, not 
only the indictment$ thereunder, lbut the ~ta tutes them-
selves, are bad. 
St t B -·Y~ P. (- _·)) 731 (J;J ...... ) a e v. lt.rns, u u,u, 
State v. Dia-mond, :!0:! P. H88 { .•. Y. Jl.): 
State v. Satterlee. 202 P. 636. (Kan ). ln this case 
the court said: ''The statute prescribes punishment for 
any one who carelessly or negligently handJes or ex-
poses nitroglycerin''. but does not say what acts consti-
tute carelessness or negligence, thus neces-sarily leaving 
the jury to determine what is carelessness or negligence 
in any particular case.'' The court then says that neith-
er the statute nor the indictment drawn in the language 
of the statute, ''inform the defendant of the nature and 
cause of he accusation against him." 
See also Ex parte Moo·re, 224 P. 662 (Ida.). 
That this principle with relation to language such 
as is used here and applied by the foregoing authorities 
in cases alleging a substantive offense, also apply to al-
legations of the agreement is shown by numerous cases, 
some of which are cited in the brief of Appellant Erwin. 
It is not contended that the means must be alleged 
independently of the statute in every instance, but the 
rule is that they must lbe alleged unless the language of 
the statute clearly indicates the "acts" constituting 
''the means agreed upon''. 
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United States v. Grwnberg, 131 F. 137 (C. C. A.) ~s 
a case squarely illustrating what we point out here. 
'There, the indictment which "ras held bad, alleged that 
the defendants 11amed conspired and confederated, etc., 
by "agreeing to defraud the United States of America 
of large sums of money to become due and payable to 
the United States of America as customs duties ac-
cruing upon divers importations of merchandise to be 
thereafter imported and brought by Grunberg, Baitler 
and Burnham * * * from Switzerland into the United 
States * * * into the port and ·collection district of Bos-
ton and Charlestown in s1aid district of Ma8'sachusetts. '' 
The opinion of Justice Putnam says : 
''Every element is here which is necessary 
to make out to the common understanding on 
offense. But, according to the ~settled pr,a,ctice 
on indictments for conspiracy, whether the means 
to be er1nployed are in themselves lawful or un-
lawful, it is not sufficient to merely allege in such 
general terms that the defendants have conspired 
to defraud. The indictment n1ust allege, to some 
extent at least, the means intended to be used. 
in defTauding. '' 
''Of course, there are various ways of defrauding 
the customs. Parties may conspire to defraud by 
smuggling in goods at 'night; they may conspire 
to defraud by bri'hing the custom house officers; 
they may conspire to defraud by forging invoices; 
they may conspire to defraud by false invoices; 
and the pleader must ordinarily show, in a gen-
eral way, which ·of those methods the parties tr-
tended. The- indictment must go at least so far as 
to point out something as to the \Yay in which 
the parties intended to defraud because therP 
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9 
cannot be a conspiracy known to the grand jury, 
without some kno"~lPdge of the general line in 
which it "·as to tnarch. '' 
Thus, is pointedly sho\\~n. a glaring defect in this 
indietmen t. 
Respondent. in answer to the foregoing and to the 
other arguments of appellants with relation to the in-
dictment, merely cites People vs. Tene·rswicz, 266 Mich.. 
276; 253 }.~. W. 296. This case was cited and distin-
guished in our original ibrief. (F. & P. p. 15 ). Respondent 
passes over it very lightly, doubtless for the reason that 
it is clearly distingnishalble. 
That case charged that certain police officers, nam-
ing them, and certain named operators of houses of 
prostitution conspired unlawfully "to permit and allow 
the keeping, maintaining and operating of houses of 
ill fame." The import of the indictment, the hill of par-
ticulars and the proof is that they entered into an agree-
ment for the operation of the houses of prostitution, 
of the defendant operators, and that such operation 
was a felony under the laws of the State of Michigan. 
The opinion is somewhat confusing and illigi:cal. J t 
cites the ·case of People vs. McKee, 146 Pac. 522, (See F. 
& P ., p. 16), which held that such an agreement with op-
erators by officers constituted a conspiracy to "obstruct 
justice.'' This opinion then loses track of this, and ar-
gues that this operation was a crime, and then cites a 
number of cases to support it, and ends up by holding 
that what was charged was a substantive offense, and 
that these parties conspired to commit it. It was not un-
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der a conspiracy statute, but was a common law con-
spiracy. The opinion points out that it was shown that 
every defendant charged participated with the other 
defendants in operating the houses of prostitution and 
in dividing the profits among the group, eonsisting of 
the officers and operators charged. This is an entirely 
different situation and a situation where the conduct of 
the parties acting together might tend itself to prove 
the agreement, as in many other cases where a sub-
stantive offense is charged and the conspiracy con-
sists merely in combining to commit it. This we have 
pointed out repeatedJy in our lhrief is not our case. 
The conten.tions made by us here were not made 
In that ~case. The contention was made, not that the 
agreement, but that the .substantive offense was. not suf-
ficiently defined. The opinion devotes a good deal of 
diseussion to the point that where a. conspiracy to com-
mit an offense is charged, and is. so charged that the 
conspiracy is made the gist of the offense, it is not 
necessary to defin.e the substantive crime with the same 
particularity as if the commission of the substantive of-
fense was a direct charge. While this is a ·<1oubtful prop-
position itself, it is not involved here. We might add, 
ho,vever, that in the later ea·se of People vs. Wester-
berg, 265 N. W. 489, the same court he1d that an indict-
ment ·charging that the defendant did break in and en-
ter the building of a person named in an attempt to com-
mit a felony, was had for the reason that it did not de-
fine the acts which it was claimed would constitute the 
felony. ·The opinion says: 
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"'Both in this ~tate and ('l~l\where it is thP 
rule that. "-here a ~tatutP uses getH\ral or g"l\llPrie 
terms in de~erihing an offense ~ • .-. or the ·statute 
charges a mere legal conclusion, an inforn1a tion 
which alleges the crime in the \\~ord~ of the ·~tat­
ute is not sufficient.'· 
IKSUFFICIEXT E\TlDENCE 
The extended and as \Ve belieYe, sound a.rgument~s 
and the numerous authorities eited in our main briefs 
show that the evidence here is \\·holly insufficient. These 
are met by the statement that it will help to arrange the 
same evidence in chronological order and :by the cita-
tion of the lTtah case later considered. As was stated in 
Wyatt v. r:. 8., 23 F (2) 791 (F. & P., 132, 172) alw.ays, 
''Keeping in mind that the one crime which 
the indictment charged against all defendants is 
conspiracy * * * not the substantive crime of 
violating the law itself ... ·. ", 
the chronological arrangement by respondent here 
does not aid its case even though, it will be dbserved 
that it contains over-statements of what was actually 
testified. 
Usually where the agreement is the gist of the of-
fense and the parties charged are not accused of com-
mitting a substantive crime, so that their joint engage-
ment in the crime may be some evidence of the agree-
meat, there is some evidence of association, convers1a-
tions, correspondence, ·communications or confederation 
of some kind. Here there is none.· The trial eourt indi-
cated that the fact that operations were carried on which 
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12 
were always carried on, is no proof of any a.gree·ment. 
Neither is the individual conduct or statements shown 
by the chronological statement, legal proof of the 
agreement here, or of the participation of any appel-
lant therein. 
It is. only necessary to exannne the respondent's 
statement of the evidence, keeping in mind that the 
thing to be proved is "the" agreement, to at once de-
termine this. There must be a meeting of the minds of 
alleged conspirators on the alleged means before there 
~can be an agreement. 
The state, by its independent ·charge in the Bill of 
Particulars, and b!J its proof, attempted to center upon 
some question of knowledge of isolated law violations. 
This. is utterly immaterial. The cases go much further 
and hold that even knowledge of the existence of con-
spiracy as alleged in the indictment, and even though 
one is in position to stop it and has the duty to do 
so, does not justify a eonvi·ction. (~See F. & P., p. 80, 81) 
Any ·condition or cireumstance that does not point 
directly to p-roof of the agree1nent must be eliminated 
in considering the question of evidence to support the 
conspiracy here. (F. & P., p. 21-24) In State v. Judd, 
279 P. 935, this Court goes further and says : 
''Evidence is not relevant or admissible un-
less it tends to establish the facts sought to be 
proved.'' 
And the same rule is. announced in State v. Dean, 254 P. 
142, by this Court, the opinion there said: 
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"Evidence to be rele,~ant or material, of 
course, must haYe son1e probative ,·alue, and in 
some degree must tend to proYe "·hat is claimed 
for il'' 
There is no esca.pe from the authorities cited, (F. & 
P., p. 20, 23) to the effect that eYidence to be considered 
as sustaining the charge must, in this kind of case, 
based entirely upon circumstantial eYidence, ''so dis-
tinctly indicate the guilt of the accused as to leave no 
reasona'ble explanation of them which is consistent with 
the prisoner's innocence." (F. & P. p. 2:2) 
So we see ~o-ain that even the wild opening stat~· 
ment of the prosecuting attorney at the trial, if"· ad~-: 
mitted to be true, and now the statement of evidence 
by respondent in its brief and in its argument, do not 
sustain or tend to sustain the charge of the agreement 
alleged, no matter how it is arranged. Nor is there any 
escape from the rule quoted from 16 C. J. p. 652, that 
while prima facie proof of the existence of a conspiracy 
might be sufficient to let in proof of the separate state-
ments of the different alleged conspirator~ at different 
times the rule of law now applicable as to such is this: 
''But in order to warrant the consideration 
<>f such evidence by the jury, a higher degree of 
proof is required and it is necessary that the ex-
istence of the conspiracy be established or shown 
clearly, and indeed it has been held that such 
evidence can be considered only where the con-
:spiracy is established beyond a reasonable 
doubt." (F. & P., p. 103) 
And, further, thi~ Court has .said .1n a 'I1umber . of 
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cases that this question as to whether the evidence is 
sufficient to justify a verdiet is a question of law to be 
·determined by the court. In Stale v. Karas, 136 P. 788, 
this question was involved and, the holding of the Court 
1s reflected in the syllabus as follows: 
''While the jury are the judges of the facts * * ~ 
it is * * * for the Court, and not the jury to de-
cide in every ·case whether the evidence will jus-
tify a verdict for the party adducing the evi-
dence.'' 
Dis,cussing this same principle in Spring Cavnyon v. 
Industrial Commission, 201 P. 173, at 176, this Court 
aga1n says: 
''Whether a:n1 inference may legitimately he de-
duced from a particular fact or from a state of 
facts, or from cireumstances, is purely a question 
of law; while the prdba:tive force or effect that 
shall ihe given to the· inference, if, as a matter of 
law it may legitimately be deduced from the giv-
en fact or state· of facts, or circumstances, is a 
question of fact. Whether the inference in que.s-
tion may be deduced as claimed is therefore a 
question of law which we must determine as 
such.'' 
Respondent makes the statement throughout its 
brief and ar.guments in re.ferenee to separate and dif-
ferent statements or conduct at different times by dif-
ferent allege·d ·conspirators that this is ''some evi-
dence of guilt." Guilt of what? 
The S'tate is invoking the pernicious. doctrine that 
a eonvietion may be sustained on suggestions and in-
timidations of misconduct of which appellants have not 
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been cha.rged aJld of ". hich tht:\y ha Yt:\ had no opportun-
ity, and ngaiust "~hieh, there \Ya~ uo duty to defend; and, 
in a properly conducted C<l~t:\ they 'vould not be per-
mitted to defend. This practice has 'been eondemned not 
only by numerous cases cited. in our original briefs, but 
by Courts generally. (F. & P., p. 79-90) 
Further as was aptly stated by Judge Rudki.ns, 7 F 
(2) 28: 
··A conspiracy is not an ominous charge, under 
which you can prove anything -and everything, 
and convict of the sins of a lifetime." (F. & P., 
p. 135) 
And in connection with the testimony of Austin 
Smith and Hayes, and even the long hearsay statements 
of Fisher Harris, and particularly the testimony of 
Holt, we ask the Court to consider the statement by the 
Supreme Court of the State of California: 
"To admit such declarations and such hearsay 
testimony in proof of the conspiracy • • "" ' ' 
would "in charges of criminal conspiracy, ren-
der the innocent and helpless victims of .villain-
ous schemes supported and moved by the pre-
arranged and manufactured evidence of the pro-
moters thereof." (F. & P., p. 94) 
-on this phase of the case respondent cites the opin-
ion of Judge Straup as quoted in the Inlow case. This 
language was not there used by Judge Straup as he did 
not write the opinion in that case, hut it was quoted 
there. The language was used by Judge Straup in State 
v. Tidwell, 44 Utah 248, 139 P. 863. It was to the effect 
that evid(lnce must be considered in its relation to other 
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evidence. This, of ·course, is not denied. This was a lar-
ceny case involving the stealing of a cow and in which 
the opinion re-cites: ''The record shows ample evidence 
to support the verdict.'' 'This quoted statement was 
made in connection with the testimony of a butcher, as 
to the kind of beef that he had purchased from the de-
fendant, indi·cating that it was such beef as was claimed 
to have been stolen by him. It was an incident merely 
in the ease not essential to the conviction, and immedi-
ately following the quotation give:n 'by respondent, Judge 
Straup said : 
''We think this evidence had a direct relation 
between and connection with other facts shown, 
and that it, together with such other evidence, 
tended to .show that the beef sold and delivered 
to the 'butcher was the beef of the stolen cow." 
Certainly no one should object to this kind of evi-
dence in this kind of ease. But we ask the Court, what 
are the eonneeting facts eve~n as now recited by the re-
spondent which, together with other evidence, proves, 
or even tends to prove the agreement alleged here be-
t,veen the defendants, and particularly after the exclu-
sion as to each .circumstance of "any hypothesis" con-
sistant 'vith the non-existence of an agreeme·nt, or of the 
non-participation in the making of the agreement al-
leged, if any agreement had been proved. 
The foregoing considerations, when the authorities 
heretofore cited. are considered, require reversal of this 
case as we believe, independent of the later showing in 
our briefs. These relate as to a vast number of circum-
st~nces \vhich were inadmissible because of lack of foun-
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dation, or other\vi~e. and 1becau8e of lack of eorrobora-
tion of admitted accompliee~. or for the othPr reasons 
stated; and also other ·errors .. 
We shall now briefly point out that appellants' 
contentions and authorities on these and other rna tters 
stand unanswered. 
SEPARATE MATTERS OF ·DEFENSE 
I. 
Under classification of evidence (1), (F. & P., p. 13, 
56) we pointed out that the fact of operating of houses 
of prostitution, or the fact of gambling in licensed card 
rooms, or the fact that lotteries occasionally operated, 
whe14 as shown in the evidence and as instructed by the 
court, they had operated, not only at the times alleged 
in the indictment but also at prior and later times, and 
operated in spite of anything that could be done in any 
metropolitan city, was no proof of the agreement al-
leged. This was perfectly obvious. 
Respondent passes over this merely with the state-
ment, "The facl that these places operated was not evi-
dence of an agreement, but when we consider that that 
evidence with the fact that collections were being made, 
instructions were being given to open and close these 
places, we immediately see that their operation does 
aid us in determining that the agreement existed." 
We would like the Court to think about that, as it is 
the basic and fundamental contention of respondent 
here and throughout its :brief. No collections were made. 
by appellants. 
Collections were made from houses of prostitution, 
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only by the state's protected, corrupt and uncorroborat-
ed erook Holt, if he is to he believed, in confederation, 
he said, with Rosenblum, who was never claimed to be 
a conspirator. This was in 1936, and with Ben Harmon 
in ·the latter half of 1937. The only other -collection tes-
tified to was by a stranger, Stubeck, from one or two 
card rooms totally disassociated from any appellant and 
between January and April of 1937 when H. K. Re-c-
ord, another of respondent's witnesses, was head of 
the anti-vice squad and not even Holt was in it. 
How eould these possibly be circumstances which 
under the rule of evidence that the circumstance must 
point directly to proof of the agreement between the 
alleged ·Conspirators, after ex-cluding every hypothesis 
of the absence of such agreement or the absence· of con-
nection of the appell•a.nts with the agreement, if one were 
proved. Can this lb·e said to be .such proof of the agree-
ment alleged~ Not ''an'' agreement, hut ''the'' agree-
ment. 
The next suggestion is that because instructions 
were given to open a~nd -close these places, this is proof 
of the agreement. Now Holt did testify that in January 
of 1937 Mr. Finch, and he alone told him to close these 
places, and he said he told them to ·Cllose and he guessed 
they temporarily did. His own evidence is, however, that 
they ·couldn't stop prostitution even if they placed a 
man in every known place. He testified that Mr. Finch 
afterwards said to allow them to run but not run too 
openly. As shown hereinafter, this was not corroborated 
and was denied :hy Mr. Finch. 
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~The other matt~r of elo~ing· wa~ that ht> ordered 
Holt to ~ee Rosenblum and d~n1nnd that th~ law be ob-
served in his card room, and later ordered him to close 
up Rosenblum. This \\·as at the very time that Holt 
testified that he \vas collecting and turning prostitutes 
money over to Rosenblum in the la~t half of 1936. Thi~ 
is the evidence as to opening and closing. Ho\v does 
this prove the '~agreement here alleged.'' In addition, 
this is the conduct of one alleged conspirator whlch 
could not properly be introduced into the case until 
a foundation was laid by making independent proof 
of the conspiracy, and cannot now be considered at 
all until the eonspiracy is independently proved. .T.o 
be proof of an overt act it must first 'be shown that the 
conspiracy existed, that :Yr. Finch was a party to the 
agreement, and it was done to effect the object thereof. 
103-11-3, R. S. "C. But, and in any event it does not 
wder- the rule of circumstantial evidence in any degree 
tend to prove the conspiracy here alleged. A moment's 
analysis of the actual charge will definitely convince of 
this. 
II. 
Under classification (2), (F. & P. p. 13, 58, Resp. 
p. 56) we made a rather exhaustive discussion and ci-
tation of authorities relating to the contention of re-
spondent that long recitals of things by Fisher Harris 
and other witnesses and involving rumors of what they 
had heard, claimed to have been recited to different 
defendants, were here erroneously admitted as hearsay; 
and while they were admitted upon the theory that they 
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involved an admission, were wrongfully admitted for 
the different reasons discussed at the places above in-
dicated. And partieularly, and we again emphasize this, 
because in no instance did they relate to the offense 
charged here or to guilt of making the agreement. NQt 
once was the alleged agreement or confederation of 
these defendants ever even intima ted in connection with 
these alleged admissions. Now the respondent answers, 
but cites no authority in ·contradiction of our author-
ities that the charge must be of the offense made and 
the answer ·Or the conduct of the defendant must con-
stitute :an admis.sion of the eharge alleged. This is stu-
diously evaded and avoided. 
Respondent says in relation to these that the state 
claimed that they ''showed a consciousness. of guilt on 
behalf of the defendants." Guilt of what? We ask the 
Court to read this part of the State's argument with 
this question in mind. 
Reference is made to the testimony of Austin Smith 
and Ellett within ~thirty days after Mr. Finch had 
taken offi·ce in March, 1936, when he certainly could 
have 'been conne·cted with no monthly collections on the 
first of the month. Further, there is not a wtOrd. of evi-
dence that anyone ·collected frorn anyone in the first 
half of 1936 or until August of that year. Austin Smith 
had been removed from the .office of secretary to the 
Mayor. He obviously falsified when he said he went 
to Mr. Finch '·s home and was met by Mrs. Finch at the 
door when Mrs. Finch was sick in bed and died from 
the sickness that then confined her, and makes the- con-
fusing statements that Mr. Finch said. ''The pay- off is 
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$2,000.00 and probably ... \.b~ Ro~enblum would colh.\ct it.'' 
This vtitness apparently t.ri~s to sho"~ that Mr. Fiuch 
had kno"~le-dge of a preYious pay-off and then tries to 
project it into the future by saying Rosenblu1n ''would'' 
collect. It \Yill be remembered that Holt 'by his o\\,1 
testimony did not contact Ros~nblum until August of 
1936, and it was shortly after that Mr. Finch ordered 
his card room closed. for law Yiolations. 
Now Mr. Ellett testified ''his friends'' had. told 
him that Finch · • was receiving'' $2500.00 a month be-
hind his back. We will not here discuss the admissiblity 
of this kind of evidence as that has been argued and, 
as stated, this was during the first thirty days that 
Mr. Finch was in office and he stated that he did not 
think any mention of that kind could be intended to ap-
ply to him. 
It will be n<>ted in stating this evidence, and we plead 
with the Court to examine the actual record of testi-
mony, that this and other testimony is not properly set 
forth in respondent's discussion here, particularly the 
conversations of :\Ir. Harris. 
But, and this is the point, supposing :\Ir. Finch did 
have knowledge of a pay-off, or supposing Mr. Pearce 
di~ have knowledge of a pay-off in ~larch, 1936, or any 
other time, and it is testified that at three or four dif-
ferent times at several month's intervals during the t\\yo 
years of 1936 and 1937 someone did say to Mr. Finch 
in substance that there were rumors of a pay-off, what 
does it prove as to the con tract alleged here~ It is only 
eVidence of the agreement that we are interested in. 
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There is here no question of whether something was done 
accidentally or without intent, or that if an agreement 
\vere made that it was so made. If the agreement had 
been proved whether Mr. Finch vvas indifferent to rum-
ors, and we think the evidence shows he was not, added 
nothing. Certainly it could not be admitted as proof of 
soinething done to further the agreement until the agree-
ment, and his connection with it, was proved. It does not 
tend to prove any confederation or agreement with any 
alleged conspirator. And the law is that indifference to 
a known conspiracy does not constitute an offense. 
In this part of the argument it is contended particu-
larly that \V hen Mr. Harris either said to Mr. Fish or 
wrote on a piece of paper and handed it to Mr. Fish at 
the Alta Club, after the conspiracy is alleged to have 
been ·closed, and in which it was stated or written that 
~1r. Erwin vvas receiving $750.00 and Mr. Finch $500.00, 
that Mr. Finch said he had not heard of this. Respond-
ent says Mr. Finch did not deny it but Mr. Harris testi-
fied that he did. Anyway, respondent sums this up by 
saying, "it showed the consciousness of guilt." 
Now first, we say there is no evidence that this par-
ticular thing had ever been stated even as a rumor to ~Ir. 
Finch previously, so that if he made this statement it 
was apparently true, and secondly, we say again, Guilt of 
what~ 
If he had said in so many 'vords, ''I am receiving 
$500.00, ,., it vvould have no tendency to prove the agree-
lnent alleged here nor vvould it he conduct which could 
be used against any other defendant in the rasP. Re-
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the point. becau~e in eYery in~tanee "·here an undenied 
charge is introduced a~ an ad1nission it is a eharge of the 
offense for "·hich the defendant is being tried, and in no 
instance is there any such thing here. This mass of in-
competent recitals offered as testimony as discussed in 
our original brief were inadmissible for the reasons 
given, and in no event do they tend to prove the agree-
ment. Respondent says "·hen they "·ere told that there 
were rumors of these ··illegal ':rice activities'' they should 
have disclosed that they had heard of them at different 
times from other sources (Resp. p. 66), that their con-
duct indicated an intention to evade as much as possible 
the truth surrounding the pay-off in Salt Lake City, and 
that this was proof of the agreement. We say that un-
der the law cited in our main brief that if respondent 
had proved a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt and 
if defendant had said, ''I know of this conspiracy r I 
know it exists. I know that houses of prostitution are 
operating as a result of this agreement. I am not doing 
anything about it and I don't intend to,'' that this would 
not make him a party to the conspiracy and there is no 
law cited to the contrary. (See F. & P. p. 79-83.) 
How can respondent then depend upon a lot of re-
eitals at different times by different people of rumors of 
prostitution and gambling in card games and one OJ;" two 
mstances of lotteries, never brought to the knowledge of 
any appellant at the time, as either proof of the agree-
ment alleged, or the connection of any appellant with it, 
no matter how often it was stated, or whether he de-
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nied or admitted that he knew about it. This contention, 
it appears to us, is too absurd for further comment. 
III. 
Under classification (3), (F. & P. p. 14, 74) we dis-
cussed, as stated by respondent, seventeen different 
points of evidence which we contended were erroneously 
introduced and further did not tend to prove the agree-
ment, vvhich is the corpus delicti of the crime here alleged. 
It includes intin1ations of -vvrongful acts or neglect or 
statements claimed to indicate irregular conduct of sepa-
rate individual defendants at separate places and at dif-
ferent times during the two years involved. It in no way 
relates to the agreement alleged. 
Respondent says we shouldn't take these instances 
separately but together and in connection with other evi-
dence. We do not care how they are taken or in what 
order. The authorities cited in our main brief commenc-
ing at page 78 clearly sustain our position with reference 
to them and this contention and this authority stands 
unrefuted. 
Respondent -ci~tes with some little, variations its testi-
mony again and again. There are some misstatements of 
the record which are n1ore or less important. On page 
88 they ·contend that Holt's testimony was. that Mr. Fineh 
told him to quit making collections. We say it comes 
down to the same staten1ent that they previously made 
with relation to the same evidence, that he told him to 
close up son1e places. We cite this testilnony as showing 
the caliber of this uncorroborated, corrupt 'vitness (See 
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F. & P. p. 35-37). and ''"e again assert that it comes down 
to just ''"hat "·e stated. 
Respondent sums up this part of its brief ·at page 
90 bv saYing that the~e incidents tended to establish •. . '--
'~the connection of th~ defendants 'vith the conspiracy" 
alleged in the indictment. This contention must presup-
pose that the conspiracy had been proved. It is appar-
ently conceded that this kind of testimony doesn't prove 
the conspiracy. 
Now again 'Ye ask that the Court take each state-
ment made by respondent from pages 84 to 93 under this 
classification and try to find one that shows the connec-
tion of any defendant with any agreement as alleged in 
this indictment. We think there is no such. In this con-
nection we directly challenge the statement made by re-
spondent on page 85 that even Holt or anybody else has 
testified that ~Ir. Finch told Holt to see Rosenblum about 
making collections. On this matter, and this is intimated 
at other places in the brief, there is testimony of Mr. 
Finch and ~Ir. Thacker and other officers that ~fr. 
Finch did at times, when burglaries were frequent in Salt 
Lake, tell different officers to see not only Abe Rosen-
blum but others who operated card rooms, as well as op-
erators of different cafes and beer parlors, and try to 
get assistance as to any ''hangers-on'' around these 
places who might be committing these burglaries. He did 
tell Mr. Holt to see Rosenblum about the operation of 
his card room and to see that it was operated within the 
law, and later, to see that it was closed. 
But, if Mr. Finch had told Abe Rosenblum to see 
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Holt and tell Holt to collect from houses of prostitution 
and bring the money to Rosenblum and tell Rosenblum 
to bring it to him, still that would not prove the agree-
ment here alleged nor tend to prove it. There is not a 
scintilla of legal evidence that Mr. Finch ever touched a 
cent of corrupt money. This whole contention amounts 
to the proposition that 1\fr. Finch's attitude or some other 
person's attitude toward a strictly closed town is proof 
of the agreement here. 
Respondent must know that this is not true, and the 
district attorney also knew that he could get a conviction 
anyway by making a lot of intimations of miscellaneous 
and colored wrong attitudes, and by getting them before 
a jury of laymen by means of his own opening statements 
and arguments and by various nondescript witnesses, and 
by prepared statements of the city attorney worked out 
for the purpose of ousting Mr. Erwin as mayor. The 
district attorney was never interested in seeing that these 
appellants had a fair trial. They have had to appeal to 
this Court for protection of their rights in this respect. 
IV. 
Under classification IV (F. & P. 90) (Res. 93), we 
discussed statements of certain persons made outside of 
the presence of any person claimed to be a conspirator. 
This relates to statements attributed to Mr. Erwin-"I 
now have my chief of police''; the statement attributed to 
Mr. Pearce that he was authorized by Mr. Erwin to make 
some arrangement with H. K. Recovd when he was head 
of the anti-vice squad; the statement made after the con-
spiracy was alleged to have closed and after the conduct 
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complained of is ~tated by Fi~her Harris to haYe stoppt~d, 
that Harmon told I-lolt that Fi~her Harris and l\l r. Lee 
had arrust'\d Mr. Pearce of being: inYoh~ed in eollPetions; 
and that staten1ent of l(empner that Stubeek had said to 
him that Harmon 'Ya~ diYiding the n1oney collected "Tith 
Ermn and his crn\vd. 
In our main briefs. we supported our contention 
that these statements were without sufficient foundation 
and were prejudicially introduced and constituted 
ground for reYersal, and do not tend to support the al-
legation of any agreement. 
We cited authorities at length (F. & P. 92) from our 
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions, showing that this 
was a matter of agency and must be \Yithin the scope of 
the agency, and after proof of agency. These authorities 
are not disputed. R-espondent (p. 93) appears to admit 
that this testimony did not tend to prove a conspiracy 
but says ''these acts were done in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.'' ""\\~ e refer the Court particularly to the state-
ment attributed to :Mr. Pearce and to Kempner and say 
again-What conspiracy? Certainly :\fr. Pearce's al-
leged conversation "ri th H. K. Record has nothing to do 
with the conspiracy alleged, and certainly Stubeck was 
never connected with any conspiracy, or with any one 
charged with being involved in this one. 
Where a substa;ntive offense is alleged as was done 
in the cases cited by respondent here, the acts done in 
consummation of the substantive offense charged, as we 
have often stated, may even be evidence of the agree-
ment, and it is stated in such cases that 1such acts by 
one in consummation of the off.ense charged, may, 
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after the -conspiracy is, proved and the connection 
of the acting conspirator therewith established, be intro-
duced as acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Here 
the offense was the agreement. This must be first proved 
in order for anything of this character to have relevance 
and if this was proved here, such statements \vould ap-
pear to have no materiality, because the principal offense 
vvould be cornplete, if and when, the agreen1ent \Yas estab-
lished. Without such proof, the admission of any of 
these_ statements \Vas clearly prejudicial. In other words, 
unles-s or until this agreement was proved, these matters 
of individual statement of conduct \Vere inadn1issible and 
if the agreement had lbeen proved they add nothing to 
that proof, and in addition were erroneously and preju-
di'Cially admitted. State v. Smith (Wash.), 174 P. 9, con-
tains in the opinion a statement of thi.s last point: 
''There is no more insidious and dangerous 
testimony than that which attempts to convict a 
defendant by producing evidence of crimes other 
than the one for which he is on trial. * :j(: * 'ro 
establish guilty intent, unlawful motive, or crimi-
nal knowledge, it is permissible to show that the 
act charged against the defendant was one in a 
series of similar ones; but beyond this the state 
cannot go, and for the purpose of seeuring a con-
viction show the p~erpetration of other similar 
acts, even though committed in furtherance of a 
general scheme, where there is no proof requirPd 
to establish intent, motive, or knowledge, other 
than proof of the act charged itself. 
Furthermore, and this is vitally important, although 
it is clain1ed some of these statements \Yere in further-
ance of the conspira·cy, an examination will show that 
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such incidental ~tate1nent of ~neh per~nn~ witl1 n.\t'Prenel) 
to other persons· state1nent~ \Yould not. and did not, in 
any ""ay. further the objpet~ of the eon~piraey. It is idle 
to contend other,Yise. 
Furthermore, the alleged staten1ent of Harn1on as to 
Pearce after the conspiracy \Yas alleged to haYP been 
concluded was admitted directly in the teeth of the de-
cision of this Court in State v. De ... 4.ngele ..... ·. 269 P. 515 
(F. & P. 106). 
Xow respondent intimates that the statement by ~lr. 
Erwin as to :llr. Finch as Chief of Police was admissible 
as an admission against interests (Res. 94) against l\lr. 
Erwin. Of course, this is not true. The law is that such 
an admission must be against the financial interest of the 
declarant at the time he makes it. "nat the respondent 
apparently means is that it is a confession of Mr. Erwin. 
But the agreement here cannot be proved by confessions 
as pointed out (E. 32-33) in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 
572, 83 Pac. (2) 1010, and other authorities cited, so that 
this cannot be taken as proof of the agreement even as 
against Mr. Erwin. "nat was it a confession of~ Cer-
tainly not the offense charged. 
There simply is no defense of the introduction of thiH 
testimony and particularly the damaging testimony of 
Kempner as to the statement of Stubeck. 
Respondent nevertheless attempts to defend this and 
cites two cases. (Res. 94.) The first is Delaney v. United 
States, 263 U. 8. 586, 68 L. Ed. 462. The reference to this 
subject in the opini.on in that case is very brief. The state-
ment as quoted by respondent as made by one of the con-
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spirators ''He told me that I ·could .s·ell whiskey, that it is 
aU right, that Mr. ·G. had talked with Mr. D·. (the prohibi-
tion director and a defendant herein) and that we could 
go ahead and sell whiskey.'' The case inolved the charge 
of the substantive offense of selling liquor in violation of 
the Prohibition Act. The statement was made at the very 
time that the person making the statement was selling 
the liquor. This is indicated from the facts as stated 
hy the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is definitely pointed 
out that the conspiracy between the speaker and the other 
conspirator mentioned had been independently estab-
lished. · The statement was made in consu1nmating the 
. very act which was the basis of the substantive charge. 
We, of course, do not contend that such a statement upon 
such foundation could not be admitted. 
But here is Stubeck, stated to have made a statement 
about division of money to Mr. Erwin, when the colle·ction 
of money is not the charge, no alleged conspirator was 
present, no relation whatsoever was shown between Stu-
beck and any alleged conspirator. He was himself an op-
erator of a licensed card room. It is not uncommon for 
people in the same industry to collect money as a de-
fense fund, or a political fund, or for the purpose of pro-
curing licenses or concessions, or for any other number of 
purposes. This money according to Kempner, was taken 
openly to Harmon and p:ass·ed. over the counter in the 
presence of a number of employees and customers. 
In any event, no consp·iracy was independently proved 
or attempted to be proved in which Stubeck was con-
nected with these appellants. It could just as well have 
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been claimed that he ntade the statemt\nt n~niust any 
member of the jury trying him, or any n1e1nb~r of the 
court, and the foundation ''"ould haY~ been the sntne. 
Certainly. this. the la'" does not permit. 
The other case relied upon by re8pondent, I nterna-
tionallndemnity Conzpany l'. Lehman, .:28 F (2) 1, "·as a 
civil case inYol Ying a conspiracy in connection '"i th the 
sale of land. The statement alleged to have been made 
as to appraisement was made during the Yery tran8action 
and after the conspiracy had been independently estab-
lished and the speaker and the person n1en tioned shown 
to have been connected in the conspiracy together. This 
was so clearly shown, as stated by the opinion, that the 
opinion says if the admission of the statement \Yere error. 
it was not prejudicial because the testimony outside of 
it was sufficient to independently require conviction. 
There are other cases where a substantive offense is 
charged and where statements were admitted \vhen made 
after the conspiracy had been established and \vhen they 
were in furtherance of the conspiracy, in the sense that 
they were made in consummation of the crime chargPd 
as the substantiative offense. We have no argument 
with these cases. But here a contention is made that one 
person can convict another by making a statement about 
him without any foundation of agency at all. 
Respondent says that such declarations made '' dur-
ing the progress and in the prosecution of, the joint un-
dertaking" have been admitted. And that is true, always 
assuming, however, that the conspiracy constituting the 
joint UIIJdertaking 1s independently proved so as to estab-
lish the agency and that the statement is within the scope 
of the agency. 
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Respondent also quoted a general statement to the 
effect that they rnay be introduced when they form part 
of ~the res gestae. T·his, involves a general exception to 
the hearsay rule, but the res gestae here is the making of 
the agreement constituting the offense alleged, so it is 
foolish to talk about res gestae. in ·connection with these 
statements, and particularly .Stubeck's alleged state-
ments. It is needless to cite decisions from this Court 
holding tha~t this rule as to res gestae ap·plies only where 
the statements are made under the influence of an acci-
dent or other similar matter and under the compulsion 
of the act, so that it is the act of speaking. That is what 
the words mean. In other words, that the speaker n1ak-
ing the hearsay statement has no opportunity to consider 
or make up a statement made. 
22 C. J. 461, Sec. 549 
''Spontaneity-a. In General. In order for 
a declaration to be admissible as a part of the res 
gestae, it must be the spontaneous utterance of 
the mind while under the influence of the transac-
tion, the test being, it has been said, \Vhether the 
declaration \vas the facts talking through the 
party, or the party talking about the facts. The 
guaranty for truth is found in such a correlation 
between the statement and the fact of which it 
forms part as strongly tends to negative the su~­
gestion of £a:hrication or invention, and a suspi-
sion of afterthought will prevent the recPption of 
the statement. 
\ 
It is difficult for us to imagine a .circumstance under 
\vhich there could be such spontaneity in connection with 
the making of an agreement alleged as the offense here. 
It· is nonsense to .talk about any of these statements hav-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ing been n1ade under sueh influ~net~. ·rhi~ tP~timony. 
particularly a~ to Stnbeek. "·n~ ju~t n~ dnn1nging as thP 
Court indicated "·hen he ~nid it "·ould probably rP~ult iu 
a new trial if not oonnee.ted up, and it neYer "·as. And 
certainly statements made after the eon~piraey endt\d 
couldn't be in furtherance of it, nor "~ithin the seope of 
agency. 
Considering our revie'' and the re~pondent 's review 
of these four classe~ of testimony "·hich includes it alL 
and the practicable admission of respondent that the ma-
jor portions of it do not tend to prove the conspiracy had 
independently been established, "'"e emphasize again that 
the evi'dence does not support the verdict here, and this 
really is so conclu5i\e as to obviate the necessity for con-
sideration of any other matter. This is not intended, how-
ever, to in any way wai\e any contentions that we have 
made because we have selected to argue to this Cour; 
only those errors which appear to us to be clear and 
manifest. 
THE TESTIMOl\""Y OF ACCOMPLICE HOLT 
The matter of corroboration of this admitted ac-
complice is discussed (F. & P. p. 117 ; Res. 108). Again 
we find ourselves to be on what we believe is s'Olid 
legal ground. We quoted from State v. LMis, 2 Pac. (2) 
243: 
·"Thus under .the statute there must be evi-
dence independent and without the aid of the tes-
timony of the accomplice to show the corpus de-
lecti that an offense was committed, and to oon-
nect the defendant with it." 
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Also: 
''The accompli·ce may ·state any number of facts, 
and thHSe facts may aU be ·COrroborated by the 
evidence of the other wi tnes•ses; .still, * * * if 
they do not point 1pertinently to the defendant as 
the guilty p.art.y or as a participant, this would 
not he such .corroboration as is required by the 
Code.'' 
It will he notieed how often the state, in attempt-
Ing to cite testimony to show any support of the alle-
gation of an agreem·ent here, has ·cited the testimony 
of H.olt and the -collections made hy him. This is done 
to try to tie the •case here in with the Tenero'\vicz case 
(F. & P. 15), a case so much relied upon by the re-
·spondent. But in that case, as has been. pointed out, 
the officers and the operators of hous·es of prostitution 
were ·collecting and dividing the money from the oper-
ations which they had a~greed to ·carry on. H·ere Holt 
nowhere testified to any agreement or ·confederation or 
understanding with the appell:ants or any of them as to 
his collections of money. H·e says he did collect and 
turn money over to Rosenblum in the latter half of 1936, 
and ~did eollect and turn the money over to Harmon in 
the latter part of 1937. 
Far from implicating Mr. Finch he corro'berates 
Mr. Finch, and testifies that in May or June of 1938 
he s1topped his ·car when he saw Mr. Hoagland and Mr. 
Finch sitting in an automobile at Mr. Hoagland's home 
and got in their car and that the following was said: 
'' Mr. Finch said : ' I don't see what ha.s been 
done that would ·cause this talk about taking 
money from the underworld and about the de-
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parlment being tied up 'Yith thP unth)r\\Torld.' 
And I said: •I don't kno"· htn,· nnyone could 
have anything on you. You don't need to \Y.Or-
rr. I don't know anYthin~· that inYolves vou in 
. . '-- . 
this.' '' 
We have never been able to see that there is any 
proof of an agreement here e,-en including Mr. Holt's 
testimony. No one could contend that outside of it there 
is anything to "shoW" the corpus delicti or to connect 
any of the appellants mth it.,' c~rta.inly no corrobor-
ation of a single thing Holt testified too. 
U:ruWnbtedly this fell{)\\ used this m-oney, or at 
least substantial amounts of it in his own operations 
as shown bv his own te~timonv. In anv- event he was 
- - w 
a confessed criminal seeking to sa,~e his o'Dl hide and 
his testimony should be regarded "-ith suspicion and 
should not be given full credence. 
- The argument of the state amounts to no more than 
this : 1-'hat this court should give full credence to the 
testimony of this witness even though they admit that he 
is an aooomplice. We say that the proposition is similar 
to that in People v. Rodriquez, 99 P. (2) 363 (this page 
was erroneously given before as 263) where the ap~ 
pelate court refused to give full credence to the testi-
mony of an alleged .accomplice and where the court 
says: 
''·Thus it appears that a treacher-ous inf1uenoo 
threatened Carroll's veracity.'' 
And in the case -of People v. Walther, 81 P. (2) 452, at 
455, where the appellat court said : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
''We may assume that the di1strict attorney has 
a right to arbitrarily seleet one of two coconspi-
rators to whom he may tender immunity from 
pr.01secution in reward for his state's evi-
dence aga.ins1t his colleague, but such evidence is 
open to 1suspicion lest the temptation to thus ex-
cape a threatened p·enalty of law may result in 
irreliahle testimony. * * * 
It is funda.mental that the fact of the exist-
ence of a -conspiracy to commit a crime must 
first :be established before the declarations of a 
coconspirator with relation thereto lbe,come com-
petent or admissible. * * * 
If the app~ellant is guilty of the last-men-
tioned offense his coconspirator is equally culp-
able, and under such .circumstances the court 
should carefully s1cru tinize hits evidence to see 
that the w.holesome rule with resp~ect to prov-
ing the f1a!cts ~constituting a -conspiracy independ-
ently of the coconspirator's admissions ha's been 
eomplied with.'' 
We beg of the ~court to examine the testimony in-
dep·endently of Holt, and assert that there will be found 
no evidence to support the charge of an agreement here. 
We · assert with confidence also that such examination 
will disclo8e no eorroboration whatsoever of Mr. Holt's 
testimony in any materi1al m~atter. 
We dis·cus:sed (F. & P. 128) this question on what 
we considered and still consider to be solid legal ground, 
so solid in fact that there is no doubt in our minds as 
to the soundness of our position. We ·contended that mere 
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proof of other or 8Ulnller eon~piraei~~ cnuld uot he con-
sidered as sustaining- the main con8pi racy here alleged. 
and also dicussed the prineipal ~rror of the court in 
refusing to instruct at all upon thi8 subject l\\'"en though 
requested to do so. ''Te did not contPihl that the proof 
of an agTeement bet\Yeen R.osenblum and Holt n1ight 
not be introduced if it "~as also proof of the n1ain agree-
ment here, but we did contend that clearly, in Yit.}\\T of 
the way this case was tried, that this evidence of this 
smaller agreement and others that "~ere suggested 
would confuse the jury into conYicting here without 
having actual proof of the main conspiracy particularly 
if they were not instructed on this issue. We ask the 
Court to consider this subject at the pages indicated 
and the authorities cited in support thereof. (F. & P. 
128 to 139). 
Now respondent (Res. 115) contends that the 
admission of evidence of different and smaller con-
spiracies was not error. This is not supported, and 
even so would not meet our contention. Respondent 
citesBerger v. United States 295 U. S. 78, 79 L. Ed. 1314 
and says that this case overrules the authorities cited 
by us. This might be important if true. A careful exam-
ination of the opinion and of our briefs indicates that 
no authorities cited by us was even mentioned, let alone 
~verrnled in this decision. In this case the indictment 
charged conspiracy to utter false nQtes of a federal re-
serve bank. 1T'he obj·ect of the utterance thus concerted 
was not stated in the indictment, but the proof showed 
an agreement between Katz, Jones and B,erger to ut-
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ter the fa1se notes and then ''to pass. the notes to 
tradesmen''. Incidentally the evidence dis-closed also 
an understanding 'between Katz and Rice, with refer-
ence to passing some of these notes ''to buy rings.'' 
With this Burger was not conne-cted. The eourt held 
that the oolllspira:cy with which he was. connected and 
convicted was alleged and also proved, that is the utter-
ance of the notes, and although evidence showed that he 
was not connected with the disposition of them in one di-
rection, that this did not eonsti~tute a variance, even if as 
·contended "in addition to proof of the ~conspiracy with 
whi-ch petitioner was -connected, proof of a conspiracy 
with which he was not connected was also furnished and 
made the 1basi1s of a vei~di·ct against others.'' The Court 
then points out that he is not in a .position to .complain 
even if the other1s were in a position where they might 
have appealed. The ·Court then illuS'trates by pointing 
o'ut that if thes·e two incidents ·of the ·oonspir.a~cy had 
been charged in different counts and Berger had been 
convicted on the one but not on the other ·count, he 
w·ou1d not be in a position to complain because others 
had been eonviete~d on the other count. They therefore 
held that Berger vvas not affected or prejudiced 'by 
the other n1:atter heeause not involved in it and not con-
victed if it. rrhat is in no way eonfliet with any of 
the authorities cited by UJS or with the sound principals 
la:id down in those authorities 
We urge particularly that the failure of the Court 
to instruct on this subject at all was prejudicial, and the 
~tate can not question that. 
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RES ~Tl~DIC.A.'r ... -\. ... -\.~ Tl) JIR .. PEARCE 
.. -\.Xl) Jl H. ER.,V"IN 
This matter i~ dioou~~t.l(l (F. & P. 1:~9; Res. 1~0) 
and we rely upon the authoritie~ there cited. \V e do 
not belie\e that the respondent'~ brief oontrovt_)rts those 
authorities nor that any further legal discu~sion would 
help the Court. " ... e do point out that hl~re is an instance 
where :llr. Pearce, for example. has been tried once on 
the \ery same eYidence from the Yery same ""itnesses, 
and only this. He is tried no'' again. What the jury 
convicted him of under the circumstances it is impos-
sible to say. 
What we do say is that unless we can get applied 
the settlecl principles of law as to pleadings, evidence. 
and trials in conspiracy charges, any defendant, can 
be tried a dozen times on the same evidence from the 
same witnesses. It emphasizes the importance of our 
contentions as to the indictment here not alleging the 
means agreed upon, and again in oonnootion with the 
last topic, the importance of the Court instructing the 
jury that they must try defendants upon the charge 
alleged alone, not upon other and smaller agreements 
between other ·and different individuals at different 
times, or upon other intimated matters of misconduct. 
Certainly a defendant in this state inust still have the 
constitutional rights to :be tried under such an indict-
ment, and such proceedure, as ''Till protect him against 
repeated trials for the same alleged conduct, and giv-
en a fair trial, and under instructions that will give 
him the constitutional protection to which he is en-
titled. 
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C~ONDUCT OF THE DISTR:UCT AT'T·ORNEY 
This subject is discussed ( F & P 154; Res. 134). We 
do not intend to discuss it again at any length. \Ye 
insist, however, that the showing made is sufficient to 
require reversal of this cause even if no other ground 
existed. We would like to cite respondent's o\vn case, 
Berger v. United States, 295 U. 8. 78, 79 1-'. Ed. 1314, 
re,cently diS:cussed under a previous top~ic as showing 
a parallel situation. In this case notwithstanding that 
the court held there was no error in the matter w·hich 
respondent and we previously di,s~cussed, it reversed the 
case because. of the conduct of the district attorney, 
which was not so seriously prejudicial as in the case at 
bar. 
In the brief and in the argument here, atte1npt i~ 
made to show that the district attorney 'vas opposed by 
such outstanding counsel and so harassed by us that his 
conduct should be excused. Unfortunately it was not us 
but the appellants who were made to suffer. A reading 
of the record, moreover, will show that he \vas not so 
harassed. In fact it will be very difficult for this Court 
to find any objections made by counsel for the rlefense 
that did not have real merit. There vvas no disposition 
on our side to over-ride the rules. We \van ted the rulP~ 
observed. With very few, if any exceptions, the re1nark~ 
that were made by us were made to the Court \vithout 
design to influence the jury, and were pertinent to tlw 
matters being discussed. 
The respondent further contends and ·cites son1e 
authorities. in support of the contention that the mere 
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fact that the pro~~enting attorn~y ~hltP~ Iuattt.'r~ whil'h 
he may not be able to proYt:.'. i~ not gnntnd for n\YPr~al 
if the staten1ent i~ n1ad~ in good t'aith. 'Yith thi~ \\'P 
agree, but \Ye ~ay that any on~ "·ould haYP tu ~tultify 
himself, in reYie,Ying the eonduct of tlu:~ di~triet attoriH\) 
here and reading his opening: statement and the other 
matters referred to in our brief ( F & P 1;)-!-l ();)) tu prP-
tend to believe that the di~triet attorn~y wa~ aeting 
conscientiously and with a good faith r~gard for the 
rights of appellants here. and "ith the purpose of giYing· 
them a fair trial. 
We point out that the conduct of the district attorney 
in the examination of lrr. Finch and reading fron1 a 
newspaper the rumors as therein recited to the jury a~ 
to alleged conditions of nee in Salt Lake City. i~ not 
only sufficient to establish, by itself alone, the absence 
of good faith on the part of the prosecuting attorney. 
but also to justify a reversal of this cause. It \vas exactly 
the kind of conduct for \Yhich the Berger case, surJra, 
was reversed by the Supreme Court of the Unite:l State~. 
(Abs. 200, F & P 169.) 
IMPROPER E\-.-IDEXCE .A.D~IITTED 
The matter of improper evidence is discussed 
throughout our former brief (F & P 166) and under all 
the four classifications of evidence contained therein. 
It would serve no purpose to attempt to revie,,v this 
discussion or the authorities. We also make reference 
to the assignments with relation to this. (F & P 16G) 
Respondent, under this heading, makes a brief discn~si( )n 
of this matter in answer to our statements. (F & P 166) 
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This appears to add nothing calling for any additional 
comrnent. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
rrhe confusion, comrnencing with the Bill of Par-
ticulars charging a different offense, and continuing 
with insinuations of irrelevant misconduct and evidence 
not pointing to the actual agreement as charged; also 
the confusion of this case with cases where substantive 
offenses were charged, has continued throughout the 
trial, and was then carried to the jury through the· 
refusal of the Court to give requests for instructions 
and also in the instructions given. (F & P 171; Res. 14!:>) 
Respondent cornmences by discussing our requests 
for instructions as to alleged admissions by silence, 
and says that they contend that Mr. Pearce's conduct 
when interviewed by Fisher Harris was an ad1nission. 
It will be recalled that lvfr. Harris testified over and 
over that he started out asking Ivt:r. Pearce for infornla-
tion, reciting that Harris had made an investigation and 
found that there was vice in existence and that then' 
was official connection therewith, and asked ~.ir. Pearce 
to give him information. He clain1s that l\Ir. Pearce 
hesitated- this was perfectly natural when infonnntion 
was being asked for after a long recital -and that ][ r. 
Pearce later denied any knowledge of it. He did 1nention 
that Mr .P·earee was eonneeted with Harmon whom he 
involved 
Again we asked admission of 'vhat~ Nothing was 
said about any connection by 1\Ir. Pearce 'vith any of 
the appellants tried. Certa.inl~! ther~ 'vas no nchnission 
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of the charge here because thert~ wn8 no 8tatt.\nl~Ht of 
it. He stated he "·as llar1non ·8 attornt\Y· That i~ Bl)t 
an admission of guilt of the offense for which he was 
tried. 
'Ve wanted an instruction that the long rt•eital~ to 
defendants of rumors, etc. as testified, "~ere not to be 
taken as evidence of the truth of tl1e n1atters r~eitPd. 
It is just foolish to contend that \Ve \Yere not entitleJ 
to an instruction on this matter. and \Ve neYPr got one. 
Contention is made that some staten1ents in our rt:\quest 
do not state the la"-· There is no authority to ~upport 
this. The requests were taken from cases cited. In any 
event, we were entitled to an instruction of snn1e kind 
on this subject. 
The next matter discussed is a request for an in-
struction on the subject of separate conspiracies or 
separate offenses by different persons. ,,~ e were certain-
ly entitled to an instruction that appellants 'vere not to 
be convicted here because of the belief of the jury that 
there had been some misconduct other than the con-
spiracy alleged. We have already mentioned this subject 
and cited numerous and most convincing authoritie~ 
thereon. It was definitely an issue made by objection 
to evidence and throughout the trial, and now the state 
contends, contrary to all of the decisions of this Court, 
that we were not entitled to an instruction at all on this 
issue. They cite again Berger v. U. S. which has not the 
slightest bearing on this subject. This was an Issue. 
Then the refusal to instruct thereon was error. That 
follows inevitably. 
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The next matters referred to by respondent is \Yith 
relation to instruction 12-a ( F & P 177; Res. 153). That 
instruction clearly permitted conviction if the jury 
thought that anybody had committed any act that might 
have been committed if an agreement, such as was al-
leged, existed. The court itself indicated that he should 
and probably would put into the instruction that a per-
son commiting any such act would have to do it kno\v-
ingly. He didn't do so. We contended that the jury 
should be instructed that in any event, the act n1ust 
be performed by one knowing of the existence of the 
conspiracy. That the conspiracy must first be proved 
and the knowing participation therein established in 
order to convict, is too clear for further discussion. No 
person's liberty would be safe if this were not the law. 
No authority is cited to the contrary. 
Respondent a number of times suggests that other 
instructions tend to correct the error con1.plained of. 
We do not find this to be so and this Court and other 
courts passing upon this question have consistent}!· 
held that where an instruction of this kind is given pur-
porting to state the law to· the jury, that the appellat 
court will not assume that the jury did not follo·w this 
instruction, but might have followed so1ne other in-
struction containing different intirnations. 
We pointed out in connection with instruction 13 
(F & P 179; Res. 153) particularly, that while the Court 
recites different alleged misconduct on state1nents by 
different individuals at different times, there was ne·ver 
any instruction that these could not be used h y the jury 
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as proof of the agr~~n1ent or to t~ll the jury thnt it had 
to be independently prov~d. Thi~ 1nattt)r i~ pa~~t\d oYPr. 
In this connection. and at page 1;)-L re~pondent 
refers to our request at page 2~~. "·ith relation tu tht· 
alleged conversation bet"·~en Pearc~ and H. I'-.. l~eeord. 
they say that this instruction doe~ not cl~arly s ta tP the 
law and thev refer to the staten1ent of ~lr. Peart•tl 
' .. 
in that conversation with relation to haYing authority 
from Mr. Erwin. This conversation "~as "~hen H. I(. 
Record was head of the anti-nee squad, "·hen nnbo{ly 
alleged to be conspirators had anything to do "·i th col-
lections and when there is not a word of eYidence that 
any collections were being made. Certainly the case 
relied upon by respondent and cited by us ( F & P 17) 
shows that this testimony "~as not admissible at all. 
It is strange that respondent would contend that, eYen 
taking this as broadly as they say, that ")Ir. Pearce 
was trying to find a collector". at that time that thi~ 
was an admission of having entered into "the" agre(·-
ment alleged in this indictment. Certainly it was in-
admissible against 11r. Erwin. Any instruction on this 
was refused. 
Respondent enters into a lengthy defense again of the 
Court's instructions to the effect that circumstantial 
evidence is sufficient if the jury believes that any in-
ference of guilt may be drawn therefrom. This is plainly 
contrary to the rule of law as to circumstantial evidence 
in this case as cited in the numerous cases under Con-
trolling Principles of Law (F & P 19-25). There cases 
are cited from this and other leading jurisdictions lead-
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ing inevitable to the rule as laid down in Terry v. United 
States, 7 F (2) 28, wherein the Circuit Court reversed 
the trial Court for instructing the jury, exactly as it was 
here instructed, that circumstance.s shown in the evi-
dence and which ''give rise to a reasonable and just in-
ference that they were done as the result of a previous 
agree1uent'' justified a conviction. The Court said: 
"This is not a correct statement of the law," 
and added: 
''The circumstances relied upon by the pro-
secution must so distinctly indicate the guilt of 
the accused as to leave no reasonable explanation 
of them which is consistent with the prisoner's 
innocence.'' 
1\espondent must ignore this principle of law other-
wise a reversal of this case follows definitely because 
of lack of evidence and because of the instructions and 
refusals of requests for instructions. But this rule of 
la'v cannot be ignored. It is too definitely established, 
and to ignore it would be to disregard an essential legal 
safe-guard which must result, and which has here re-
sulted in the conviction of men entirely innocent of the 
charge alleged. 
This instruction 16 just flatly instructs contrary to 
the law (F & P 180) and there should be no contentions 
that it was not erroneous. This instruction even goes on 
to say that the defendants can be convicted if the jury 
f\nds they conspired and agreed ''among themselves * • • 
or with Abe Stubeck". There was never a more amazing 
injustice clone to any appellants than to instruct this 
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jury that on this reeord tht'Y had nuy right or any foun-
dation or any eYidenee to tind any ngrt.'l'lltt .. )nt with .\ hl~ 
Stubeck by any appellant here any n1orP than t hnt thPy 
had an agree1uent 'vith .A.l Capone or "·ith thP Dukt' ot' 
Windsor. 'Ye pointed out al~o that the Court hnd in-
structed (F & P 182) that Stubeek te~tified that he l'ul-
lected money. This alone requires rever~al a~ a~~luning 
something exactly contrary to the eYidence, and this is 
particularly true in vie"~ of the fact that the Court 
instructed that the appellants could be eonYicted n pon 
the alleged conduct of Stu beck. Respondent has ei ted 
no authority to the contrary. (See F & P 182. See also 
I P 64-68.) 
SUFFICIEXCY OF THE E,~IDEXCE 
This is a separate subdivision (Res. 158). It again 
ignores the rule of evidence as to circumstances in con-
spiracy cases. They object that we elin1inate certain 
evidence. " ... e do not do this. The rules of la"· and eYi-
dence eliminate the great mass of alleged separate state-
ments and other matters of that kind as proof of the 
conspiracy. These matters depend upon agency and the 
conspiracy must first be independently established in 
order to establish the agency. Respondent cites a nurnher 
of cases again where a substantive crime i~ charged 
and the conspiracy simply consists in joining to e(>Jnrnit 
the crime where the corpus delicti is the crime. They 
again ignore in this case the fundamental distinction~ 
made in the authorities cited by us between that kind of a 
case and a case where the crime and the corpus delicti 
consist of the agreement. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
We now respectfully ask the Court to review the 
points in conclusion as set out in our main brief ( F & P 
185). We feel that this summarizes the errors and we 
would not be justified in repeating this summary here. 
In addition to this there is the point as to the sufficiency 
of the indictment and the other points discussed in the 
Erwin brief. (E. p 73). 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that common frankness should com-
pel the state to admit that this is a very unsatisfactory 
case. No legal mind, we think, can take the pleadings 
and their evidence and their brief here, and applying 
recognized legal principles thereto, get any satisfactory 
basis to support a conviction. It should be admitted that 
in this hodge-podge of confusion there is no assurance 
that any conviction here rests upon a clear understanding 
by the jury of the actual charge and of the proper appli-
cation of the evidence thereto. These are the very foun-
dation of a fair trial. It certainly appears to us that 
everything that is claimed here against any appellant 
could have been done, if it was done, without even the 
existence of any agreement as alleged. That, really is the 
test a~ to circurnstantial evidence. 
\Ve are dealing now with a question of law, as 
pointed out in the second division of this brief. Whether 
under the application of the rule as to circumstantial 
evidence in this kind of a case, this evidence supports 
the verdict. This is a question of law. It is also a ques-
tion of law as to whether legitimate inferences of guilt 
of the offense charged may be deduced from particular 
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facts (201 P. 173, supra). Ct:\rtninly UP Court. and no 
legal Dlind, can detern1ine thn t guilt 0 f t ht\ offt:\ll~P 
charged n1ay ''legitin1ately be dt~duef'd · · fro1u ~epnratP 
circmnstances depended upon by the ~tatP tP eon,·i(·t 
appellants here. 'Ye do not mean thnt some inference 
may not be dra,,ll of a "·rt)ng attitude or nf a ean\le~~­
ness or of neglect "-e Inean legitiinate inferenet:\~ of guilt 
of the charge here alleged. If "-e do not li1nit the in-
ferences that may be legitimately dra"~ to the offense 
charged, then ''e may as well thro'v a"-ay all la\\· book~ 
and all legal procedure. 
We respectfully submit that this case should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. L. ~Il"'LLI~"'"ER. 
~-ittorney for ~-!ppPllant .... · 
H/}1·ry Finr-J, af?d R. 0. Pea.rce. 
BALL AXD Jil ... SSER, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant ' 
E. B. Erwin, on the Brief. 
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